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Abstract. Increasingly, administrative data is being used for statistical purposes, such as for registry-based census taking. Due to
privacy concerns, this often requires linking separate files containing information on the same unit without revealing the identity
of the unit. If the linkage has to be done without a unique identification number, it is necessary to compare keys derived from
personal identifiers. When dealing with large files such as census data, comparing each possible pair of keys for two files is
impossible. Therefore, special algorithms (blocking methods) must be used to reduce the number of comparisons needed. If the
identifiers have to be encrypted due to privacy concerns, the number of available algorithms for record linkage and blocking
is very limited. This paper describes the combination of a recently introduced encryption method for identifiers with a novel
algorithm for blocking. Simulations show that the performance of these techniques allows their use for Big Data applications,
censuses and population registries.
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1. Introduction
Due to the increasing availability of administrative
information and the rising costs of primary data col-
lection, linking different databases to determine their
overlap or to enhance the information available for a
certain unit is a commonly used strategy for statisti-
cal purposes. For example, of the forty European cen-
suses in 2010, only twenty-one were traditional cen-
suses while the rest were based on the linkage of reg-
istries [22].
However, official statistics agencies are confronted
with growing privacy concerns. For example, the Euro-
pean Commission conducted a survey on “Attitudes on
Data Protection” in 2010.1Although the majority of re-
spondents across Europe trusted the protection of per-
1The survey was conducted in November/December 2010 as a
CAPI survey in 27 EU states with 26.574 respondents aged 15 and
over. The sample is being reported as random route with closest
birthday selection; no response rate was given. The question asked
sonal information by national public authorities, 28%
of all respondents did not [21]. Convincing privacy
protection techniques may help national agencies con-
ducting registry based studies with these hesitant pop-
ulations.
Technical solutions for linking different databases
are trivial if a unique personal identification number
(PID) can be used. In some countries (for example,
the Scandinavian countries), a PID is available for all
members of the population. If privacy concerns pre-
vail, the PID can be encrypted differently for each
linkage operation. In practice, however, most statisti-
cal linkage operations are based on personal identifiers
was: “Different authorities (government departments, local authori-
ties, agencies) and private companies collect and store personal in-
formation. To what extent do you trust the following institutions to
protect your personal information? National public authorities (e.g.
tax authorities, social security authorities)?” Answer categories: To-
tally trust, Tend to trust, Tend not to trust, Do not trust at all, Don’t
know.
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such as name or date of birth. Such identifiers must be
combined to yield an identification code. However, the
identifiers are usually neither stable nor recorded with-
out errors [25]. If the identifiers have to be encrypted
due to privacy concerns, linking is limited to the subset
of cases with exact matching identifiers only. In many
applications, this subset is not a random sample of the
records. To address this issue, methods allowing for
small variations in the identifiers should be used. This
class of methods is called “privacy preserving record
linkage techniques” (for a review, see [23]). A method
for privacy preserving record linkage which has re-
cently become popular is the use of Bloom-Filters.
2. Using Bloom-Filters for encoding identifiers
Bloom-Filters for cryptographic encoding of identi-
fiers were first suggested in 2009 [18]. Since then, this
approach has been used in different countries by dif-
ferent research teams and compares favorably to other
approaches [15,23,24].
The basic principle is to split the string represent-
ing each identifier (for example, the name) into a set
of unique subsets of length n (n-grams). For exam-
ple, using n = 2, the bigram set of “PETER” is
_P , PE,ET , TE,ER,R_. Each bigram of the set is
mapped with k different functions into a binary vec-
tor of length l. In computer science, functions for
mapping arbitrary long strings to vectors of a fixed
length are called hash functions. For cryptographic ap-
plications, one way hash functions with an additional
keyword (keyed HMACs) are commonly used. Exam-
ples of HMACs are MD-5 and SHA-1 (for details on
HMACs, see [13]). Named after its inventor [2], algo-
rithms which use hash functions for mapping to a bi-
nary vector are called Bloom-Filters. Figure 1 shows
a simple example of mapping names to Bloom-Filters
using bigrams. In the example, eight identical bit po-
sitions are set to one in both Bloom-Filters. In total,
eleven bits in A and ten bits in B are set to one. Any
similarity measure could be used, but most commonly
the Dice coefficient [6] Dice(a, b) = 2|ab||a|+|b| is used.
In this example, the Dice similarity of the two Bloom-
Filters is (2 ∗ 8)/(10 + 11) ≈ 0.762.
In general, the similarity between two strings can be
approximated by using a similarity measure for their
Bloom-Filters. In practice, the use of longer Bloom-
Filters (500 or 1.000 bits) and more hash functions
(typically ten to twenty) has been found useful.
In the initial proposal, each identifier was mapped
to a separate Bloom-Filter. For the use in record link-
age, each identifier encoded in a Bloom-Filter could be
used for computing the similarity of two records. How-
ever, if a random sample of identifiers in the popula-
tion is available to the attacker, a cryptographic attack
on Bloom-Filters might be successful for the most fre-
quent names [12]. Therefore, the security of separate
Bloom-Filter encodings must be enhanced.
3. Bloom-Filter based privacy preserving record
linkage: Cryptographic Long Term Keys (CLK)
If a PID is not available, the number of possi-
ble identifiers is quite limited in most administra-
tive databases. Some administrative databases contain
unique identifiers. For example, birth registries usu-
ally have their own PID and in addition include hour
of birth, minute of birth, sequence number in the case
of twins, birth weight and Apgar-Score. But in gen-
eral, these special identifiers are not available in other
databases. Therefore, a key for linking must be based
on those identifiers common to nearly all administra-
tive databases. This set is, of course, specific to local
regulations, but typically this basic set of identifiers
(BSID) consists of the first name, surname (at birth),
sex (at birth), date of birth, country of birth and place
of birth. Additional identifiers are usually not given,
and if they are, they tend to be even more volatile than
those within the BSID (an obvious example is address
data). A cryptographic key based on BSIDs first re-
quires the standardization of the identifiers (e.g., con-
version to uppercase, transforming special characters,
removing titles and blanks etc.). As a next step, the set
of unique n-grams of each identifier is formed. Numer-
ical data such as date of birth is also treated as a string
and split into n-grams. Usually, each element of the
date of birth (day, month, year) is used separately as
a single string and handled independently. Finally, the
unique set for each identifier is mapped with a different
number of hash-functions and a different password for
each identifier to the same binary vector.2 The resulting
binary vector (typically 500–1.000 elements) is a cryp-
tographic long-term key (CLK), which can be used for
linking databases [19,24].
The main advantage of CLKs is the fact that they
are much more difficult to attack than a set of separate
2The number of hash-functions can be chosen to reflect the im-
portance of the identifier for the linkage. In practice, the entropy of
an identifier is a good approximation for the relative importance of
the identifier.
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Fig. 1. Example for the mapping of two names (SMITH, SMYTH) using bigrams and two hash functions to two Bloom-Filters (A, B) with thirty
bits each. Taken from [18].
Bloom-Filters. If the Bloom-Filters are not simply con-
catenated (as in [7]), CLKs have the additional advan-
tage that a given bit set to one may be caused by dif-
ferent identifiers. This attribute increases the difficulty
of attacks as described in [11] substantially.
The difficulty of an attack can be further increased
by limiting the number of bigrams per identifier. This
can be done with different methods, for example, by
not using all bigrams of a name. This will prevent the
identification of persons with longer names. For ex-
ample, for unusually long names a sample of bigrams
could be used. The probability for sampling could be
decreased with the position of the bigram in the name
so that bigrams at the beginning of the name are sam-
pled with a higher probability. Additionally, random
bits may be added; by using this carefully, the random
bits have very little impact on similarity computations.
No successful attack on CLKs has been reported up to
now. Given the way CLKs are constructed, the kind of
attacks used for Bloom-Filters will not work for CLKs.
4. Linking large databases with CLKs
Linking two databases consisting of CLKs implies
the search for pairs of very similar binary vectors. This
may be seen as a problem of finding nearest neigh-
bors in a high dimensional binary space. If we have
a database similar to the size of a census, we have to
search the nearest neighbor among more than 100 mil-
lion candidates. Therefore, a direct comparison of sim-
ilarity among all pairs of CLKs is practically impossi-
ble. The number of comparisons has to be reduced to
a range usually considered suitable for similarity com-
putations, such as cluster analysis. Hence, groupings
of cases to smaller subsets are needed. Algorithms for
generating these kinds of groupings are called blocking
methods.
4.1. Blocking methods for CLKs
There are a variety of blockingmethods for reducing
the number of record pairs which need to be compared
for use in record linkage [4]. However, with regard to
data structures similar to CLKs, the choice of possible
methods is more limited. In this paper, only suitable
candidates from the set of best performing methods in
a recent comparison study are considered [5].
Two obvious methods are the use of external blocks
and sorting. External blocks are formed by encrypt-
ing one element of the BSIDs with a different crypto-
graphic hash function and using this code as a block.
Examples for blocks are postcodes for residence, year
or decade of birth or phonetic encodings of names such
as Soundex [4]. External blocking is an application of
the widely used Standard Blocking [9] but on CLKs
with an external encrypted key. The main problem of
external blocking is, that even slight variations in a
block identifier of two records for the same person will
usually result in a missed link for this pair.
Another obvious method is sorting. In [8] the Sorted
Neighbourhood Method was introduced, which has be-
come the standard method for handling large files with
encrypted identifiers. Both input files are pooled and
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sorted according to a blocking key. A window of a
fixed size is then slid over the records. Two records
from different input files form a candidate pair if they
are covered by the window at the same time.
Canopy Clustering, as suggested by [14], forms can-
didate pairs from those records placed in the same
canopy. All records from both input files are pooled.
The first canopy is created by choosing a record at ran-
dom from this pool. This randomly chosen record con-
stitutes the central point of the first canopy. All records
within a certain loosely defined distance l from the
central point are added to the canopy. Then, the cen-
tral point and any records in the canopy within a cer-
tain more closely defined distance t from the former
are removed from the record pool. Additional canopies
are built in the same way as the first until there are no
more remaining records. The result is a set of poten-
tially overlapping canopies. Pairs which can be formed
from the records of the same canopy constitute the set
of candidate pairs.
Despite the satisfactory performance of these meth-
ods in specific settings, no blocking method shows op-
timal performance in all settings [5]. Therefore, the
search for better blocking methods continues.
4.2. A new blocking method
In 2013, the use of Multibit Trees [10] for similar-
ity filtering in general record linkage, without refer-
ence to privacy preserving record linkage, was sug-
gested by the author [1]. The method described in the
paper is called q-gram Blocking. The basic idea of q-
gram Blocking is to transform all identifiers in a stan-
dard non-privacy preserving record linkage problem to
a binary vector and then using a Multibit Tree to find
nearest neighbors. By this transformation, any method
for finding nearest neighbors in high dimensional bi-
nary space can be applied to the problem of finding
nearest neighbors in unencrypted nominal data (or at
least data treated as nominal). Therefore, this approach
can be used for blocking or similarity filtering in all
record linkage applications.
However, the suggested searching method can also
be used for blocking in privacy preserving record link-
age with CLKs. For the application of q-gram Blocking
in two files of CLKs, q-gram Blocking is simply the
search for every CLK in the smaller file, in the Multibit
Tree built from the CLKs of the larger file. Only CLKs
in the resulting set form candidate pairs.
Multibit Trees were introduced to search huge data-
bases of structural information about chemical molecu-
les [10]. If the query vectors are all binary, a query
A is searched in a database of binary vectors B. All
records in the database with a similarity to A above
a certain threshold t should be retrieved. In chemoin-
formatics, very often the Tanimoto coefficient A∩B
A∪B is
used for measuring similarity of binary vectors.3 The
coefficient is simply the ratio of the number of 1’s the
vectors have in common to the number of 1’s where
either vector has a 1. The algorithm uses the fact stated
by [20] that given the number of 1’s in A and B (de-
noted by |A| and |B|), the upper bound of the Tani-
moto coefficient is Tmax =
min(|A|,|B|)
max(|A|,|B|) . If all vectors
are stored in database indexed by |B|, searching for
the vector A can be limited to those entries for which
Smax  Smin. The increased speed of the algorithm is
primarily due to those eliminations and the use of some
special data structures. Details on the Multibit Tree al-
gorithm and an implementation in Java can be found
in [10].
For the application of Multibit Trees on files of
CLKs, the tree structure is built for the first file and the
records of the other file are queried sequentially. There-
fore, the time required for querying the records of the
second file is more important for the overall running
time than the time needed to built the tree. In general,
the average query time in Multibit Trees shows a linear
increase with the number of records in the second file.
This is an attractive scaling property of the method.
4.3. Criteria for evaluating linkage operations
The quality of the linkage operation is of vital im-
portance for privacy preserving record linkage appli-
cations. Obviously, the quality of the linkage depends
on the data quality of the identifiers. If names or date
of birth are missing or grossly wrong, all record link-
age techniques will fail. Given complete data with a
reasonable amount of errors (for example, up to 20%
records with one or two single letter errors in an identi-
fier), acceptable linkage results are possible with unen-
crypted identifiers and privacy preserving record link-
age should perform similarly. In addition, the time
needed for linkage should not exceed the institutional
constraints for linking sensitive data. Therefore, link-
age of census operations should not exceed a few
hours.
In general, the quality of linkages is evaluated us-
ing two criteria: recall and precision. Given the defini-
3Both Dice and Tanimoto coefficients have a range of 0–1, they
are monotone related.
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Fig. 2. F-measure for Canopy Clustering (CC), Sorted Neighborhood (SN) and Multibit Trees (MBT). Errors in 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% of the
records. Results for CC and MBT are nearly identical.
tions of false positives, fp (pairs incorrectly considered
a match) and false negatives, fn (pairs incorrectly con-
sidered a non-match), recall is defined as tp/(tp+fn)
and precision is defined as tp/(tp+fp). The harmonic
mean of recall and precision is the F-measure defined
as 2 · recall·precisionrecall+precision .
The number of false positives in a linkage using
Multibit Trees depends on the similarity threshold t.
If t is close to 1.0, false positives could be reduced to
nearly zero. In this case, only exact matching CLKs
would be considered a match. Exact matching CLKs
would in nearly all cases imply exact matching identi-
fiers. False positives due to exact matching identifiers
can not be avoided by any record linkage technique.
However, restricting the links to exact matches only
would induce high numbers of false negatives. There-
fore, the similarity threshold must be decreased. De-
creasing the similarity threshold will increase the num-
ber of false positives. Given this trade-off, the thresh-
old must be chosen carefully, depending on the loss
function for the application. The effect of variations of
the threshold t will be illustrated with a simulation.
4.4. Simulation of linking CLKs with Multibit trees
The performance of Multibit Trees was studied in
a series of simulations. In the initial publication of
q-gram blocking [1], comparisons inter alia between
Multibit Trees, canopy clustering, sorted neighborhood
and standard blocking were reported. In most situa-
tions, Multibit Trees outperformed the other methods,
even those that had performed best in other comparison
studies.
For the simulation reported here, files were gener-
ated with Febrl [3]. Files with 1.000, 5.000, 10.000,
50.000, 100.000, 500.000 and 1 Million records were
prepared. CLKs with 1.000 bits based on name, sur-
name, sex and day/month/year of birth as identificators
and k = 20 hash functions for each of the 6 fields were
generated with an additional Python script. The second
file was a copy of the first file, but with 0, 5, 10, 15 and
20% records containing errors.
4.4.1. Results
Figure 2 shows the F-measure for Canopy Clus-
tering (CC), Sorted Neighborhood (SN) and Multibit
Trees (MBT). The performance of all blocking meth-
ods decreases with increasing error rates, but more
sharply for the Sorted Neighborhood technique. The
results for Canopy Clustering and Multibit Trees are
nearly identical. Overall, the new blockingmethod per-
forms as well as the best known traditional technique.
To illustrate the behavior of Multibit Trees in more
detail, some further results will be reported here.4 As
4A more detailed report on the simulation is subject of a forth-
coming paper with a more technical focus.
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Fig. 3 shows, the precision achieved by the trees is in-
dependent of error and independent of file size. How-
ever, with more than 100.000 records, lower thresh-
olds than 0.9 will decrease the precision, but even with
1 million records a threshold of 0.85 will allow for a
precision above 0.95. If blocks smaller than 100.000
records can be formed, nearly perfect precision with
thresholds over 0.85 could be achieved.
In general, the observed recall for the trees decreases
linear with error but is independent of file size. Figure 4
shows a nonlinear decrease of recall with increasing
threshold. Therefore, to achieve sufficient recall, the
similarity threshold must be lowered with increasing
number of errors. A threshold of 0.85 will give a min-
imum of recall of 0.853, even with 20% errors. This
threshold has shown a minimum precision of 0.95. For
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Fig. 5. Time in minutes for finding best matching pairs (100.000–1.000.000 records) for Canopy Clustering (CC), Sorted Neighborhood (SN)
and Multibit Trees (MBT), 10% errors.
most applications, the 0.85-threshold therefore seem to
be a reasonable start value. If the application has higher
demands on precision and recall, using a threshold of
0.8 with blocks of at most 100.000 will show a mini-
mum precision of 0.976 and a minimum recall of 0.936
despite 20% errors.
4.4.2. Computing time
Figure 5 shows the computing time in seconds on
a Desktop PC with 64GB RAM and a hexa-core CPU
with 3,4 Ghz under Ubuntu 12.04LTS.
The computing time for sorted neighborhood and
Multibit Trees increases nearly linear with the number
of records within the simulated range. This property
makes them interesting options for linking CLKs.
For Multibit Trees the computing time will increase
with decreasing similarity thresholds, since the num-
ber of pairwise comparisons will increase. However,
even with a low similarity threshold of 0.85, two files
of 500.000 records with 10% errors could be matched
in 5902 seconds. For this combination of parameters, a
recall of 0.931 and a precision of 0.977 was observed:
Exactly the same performance as Canopy Clustering in
about 40% of the time.
5. Conclusion
Privacy preserving record linkage for administra-
tive datasets such as censuses require blocking meth-
ods to reduce the number of comparisons among en-
crypted identifiers. This paper illustrates the use of
Multibit Trees for all identifiers encrypted in one com-
mon Bloom-Filter (CLKs).
Different simulations of this technique with large
datasets showed similar or superior performance with
lower run times compared to previously used meth-
ods. Within the simulated range, the suggested method
shows a nearly linear increase in computing time with
increasing file size. For most statistical applications,
the speed and accuracy of Multibit trees will be suffi-
cient with standard settings.5 However, depending on
the kind of identifiers and their quality, some fine tun-
ing of the parameters will be necessary.6 It must be
kept in mind that linking with encrypted identifiers
makes clerical editing impossible. Therefore, careful
preprocessing and fine-tuning of parameters using al-
ready linked datasets has to be done in advance of the
linkage operation. This problem arises for all privacy
preserving record linkage techniques.
Additional techniques will be required for very large
datasets, such as a population census with CLKs. The
simplest option in this situation would be external
5For most applications, we used Bloom-Filters with 1.000 bits,
ten to twenty hash-functions per identifier, padded bigrams and a
similarity threshold of 0.85.
6The search for optimal settings given task parameters by re-
sponse surface fitting on simulated data is subject of ongoing work.
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blocking. For census operations, an obvious external
block would be year of birth. If year of birth is en-
crypted with an HMAC such as MD-5 or SHA-1, the
resulting code for year of birth would form a block and
within each block CLKs with Multibit Trees could be
used for linking. For European censuses, the expected
size of these blocks will rarely exceed the limits of the
simulations reported here. Hereby, privacy preserving
record linkage with CLK and Multibit trees for a cen-
sus could be done with a small cluster of servers within
24 hours.
Therefore, the techniques presented here provide a
possible solution to conducting the censuses of the next
decade in the current environment of increasing pri-
vacy concerns among European citizens.
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